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For the applied economist, the confident and appar-
ently successful application of Keynesian principles 
to economic policy which occurred in the United 
States in the 1960s was an event of incomparable 
significance and satisfaction. These principles led to 
a set of simple, quantitative relationships between 
fiscal policy and economic activity generally, the ba-
sic logic of which could be (and was) explained to the 
general public and which could be applied to yield 
improvements in economic performance benefitting 
everyone. It seemed an economics as free of ideologi-
cal difficulties as, say, applied chemistry or physics, 
promising a straightforward expansion in economic 
possibilities. One might argue as to how this windfall 
should be distributed, but it seemed a simple lapse of 
logic to oppose the windfall itself. Understandably 
and correctly, noneconomists met this promise with 
skepticism at first; the smoothly growing prosperity 
of the Kennedy-Johnson years did much to diminish 
these doubts. 
We dwell on these halcyon days of Keynesian 
economics because without conscious effort they are 
difficult to recall today. In the present decade, the 
U.S. economy has undergone its first major depression 
since the 1930s, to the accompaniment of inflation 
rates in excess of 10 percent per annum. These events 
have been transmitted (by consent of the govern-
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ments involved) to other advanced countries and in 
many cases have been amplified. These events did 
not arise from a reactionary reversion to outmoded, 
"classical" principles of tight money and balanced 
budgets. On the contrary, they were accompanied by 
massive government budget deficits and high rates of 
monetary expansion, policies which, although bear-
ing an admitted risk of inflation, promised according 
to modern Keynesian doctrine rapid real growth and 
low rates of unemployment. 
That these predictions were wildly incorrect and 
that the doctrine on which they were based is fun-
damentally flawed are now simple matters of fact 
involving no novelties in economic theory. The task 
now facing contemporary students of the business 
cycle is to sort through the wreckage, determining 
which features of that remarkable intellectual event 
called the Keynesian Revolution can be salvaged and 
put to good use and which others must be discarded. 
Though it is far from clear what the outcome of this 
process will be, it is already evident that it will neces-
sarily involve the reopening of basic issues in mone-
tary economics which have been viewed since the 
thirties as "closed" and the reevaluation of every 
aspect of the institutional framework within which 
monetary and fiscal policy is formulated in the ad-
vanced countries. 
This paper is an early progress report on this 
process of reevaluation and reconstruction. We begin 
by reviewing the econometric framework by means 
of which Keynesian theory evolved from disconnect-
ed, qualitative talk about economic activity into a 
system of equations which can be compared to data J 
in a systematic way and which provide an operational 
guide in the necessarily quantitative task of formulat-
ing monetary and fiscal policy. Next, we identify 
those aspects of this framework which were central to 
its failure in the seventies. In so doing, our intent is to 
establish that the difficulties are fatal: that modern 
macroeconomic models are of no value in guiding 
policy and that this condition will not be remedied by 
modifications along any line which is currently being 
pursued. This diagnosis suggests certain principles 
which a useful theory of business cycles must have. 
We conclude by reviewing some recent research con-
sistent with these principles. 
Macroeconometric Models 
The Keynesian Revolution was, in the form in which 
it succeeded in the United States, a revolution in 
method. This was not Keynes' (1936)
1 intent, nor is it 
the view of all of his most eminent followers. Yet if 
one does not view the revolution in this way, it is 
impossible to account for some of its most important 
features: the evolution of macroeconomics into a 
quantitative, scientific discipline, the development of 
explicit statistical descriptions of economic behavior, 
the increasing reliance of government officials on 
technical economic expertise, and the introduction 
of the use of mathematical control theory to manage 
an economy. It is the fact that Keynesian theory lent 
itself so readily to the formulation of explicit econo-
metric models which accounts for the dominant sci-
entific position it attained by the 1960s. 
Because of this, neither the success of the 
Keynesian Revolution nor its eventual failure can be 
understood at the purely verbal level at which Keynes 
himself wrote. It is necessary to know something of 
the way macroeconometric models are constructed 
and the features they must have in order to "work" as 
aids in forecasting and policy evaluation. To discuss 
these issues, we introduce some notation. 
An econometric model is a system of equations 
involving a number of endogenous variables (vari-
ables determined by the model), exogenous variables 
(variables which affect the system but are not af-
fected by it), and stochastic or random shocks. The 
idea is to use historical data to estimate the model and 
then to utilize the estimated version to obtain esti-
mates of the consequences of alternative policies. 
For practical reasons, it is usual to use a standard 
linear model, taking the structural form
2 
A0yt + A,yt-i + ... + Amyt_m = B()xt + B,xt-i (1) 
+ ... + BnXt-n + et 
R0et + R,et-, + ... + Rret_r = ut, R() = I. (2) 
Here yt is an (LX1) vector of endogenous variables, xt 
is a (KX1) vector of exogenous variables, and et and 
ut are each (LX1) vectors of random disturbances. 
The matrices Aj are each (LXL); the Bj's are (LXK), 
and the Rj's are each (LXL). The (LXL) disturbance 
process ut is assumed to be a serially uncorrelated 
process with Eut = 0 and with contemporaneous co-
variance matrix Eutu! — £ and Eutu's = 0 for all t ^ s. 
The defining characteristics of the exogenous vari-
ables xt is that they are uncorrelated with the e's at all 
lags so that EutXs is an (LXK) matrix of zeroes for all 
t and s. 
Equations (1) are L equations in the L current 
values yt of the endogenous variables. Each of these 
structural equations is a behavioral relationship, 
identity, or market clearing condition, and each in 
principle can involve a number of endogenous vari-
ables. The structural equations are usually not regres-
sion equations
3 because the et's are in general, by the 
logic of the model, supposed to be correlated with 
more than one component of the vector yt and very 
possibly one or more components of the vectors yt_ b 
• • • yt-nv 
The structural model (1) and (2) can be solved for 
yt in terms of past y's and x's and past shocks. This 
reduced form system is 
yt = -Piyt-1 —... — Pr+myt-r-m + Qoxt +... (3) 
+ Or+nXt-n-r + Ao'^t 
where
4 
'Author names and years refer to the works listed at the end of this 
paper. 
2Linearity is a matter of convenience, not principle. See Linearity 
section below. 
3A regression equation is an equation to which the application of 
ordinary least squares will yield consistent estimates. 
4In these expressions for Ps and Qs, take matrices not previously 
defined (for example, any with negative subscripts) to be zero. 
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QS = V. £ RjBs-j. 
The reduced form equations are regression equa-
tions, that is, the disturbance vector A~dut is orthog-
onal toy t-i, ..., yt-r_m,xt, ..., Xt-n-r-This follows 
from the assumptions that the xs are exogenous and 
that the u's are serially uncorrelated. Therefore, un-
der general conditions the reduced form can be esti-
mated consistently by the method of least squares. 
The population parameters of the reduced form (3) 
together with the parameters of a vector autoregres-
sion for xt 
xt = Cixt-1 + ... + CpXt-p + at (4) 
where Eat —0 and Eat'xt-j — 0 for j^l completely 
describe all of the first and second moments of the 
(yt,xt) process. Given long enough time series, good 
estimates of the reduced form parameters—the P/s 
and Qj's— can be obtained by the method of least 
squares. All that examination of the data by them-
selves can deliver is reliable estimates of those 
parameters. 
It is not generally possible to work backward 
from estimates of the Fs and Q's alone to derive 
unique estimates of the structural parameters, the 
A/s, B/s, and R/s. In general, infinite numbers of As, 
B's, and R's are compatible with a single set of Fs and 
Q's. This is the identification problem of econo-
metrics. In order to derive a set of estimated structural 
parameters, it is necessary to know a great deal about 
them in advance. If enough prior information is im-
posed, it is possible to extract estimates of the A/s, 
B/s, R/s implied by the data in combination with the 
prior information. 
For purposes of ex ante forecasting, or the un-
conditional prediction of the vector yt+1, yt+2> . . . 
given observation of ys and xs, s ^ t, the estimated 
reduced form (3), together with (4), is sufficient. This 
is simply an exercise in a sophisticated kind of extrap-
olation, requiring no understanding of the structural 
parameters, that is, the economics of the model. 
For purposes of conditional forecasting, or the 
prediction of the future behavior of some compo-
nents of yt and xt conditional on particular values of 
other components, selected by policy, one needs to 
know the structural parameters. This is so because a 
change in policy necessarily alters some of the struc-
tural parameters (for example, those describing the 
past behavior of the policy variables themselves) and 
therefore affects the reduced form parameters in a 
highly complex way (see the equations defining Ps 
and Os above). Unless one knows which structural 
parameters remain invariant as policy changes and 
which change (and how), an econometric model is of 
no value in assessing alternative policies. It should be 
clear that this is true regardless of how well (3) and 
(4) fit historical data or how well they perform in 
unconditional forecasting. 
Our discussion to this point has been highly gen-
eral, and the formal considerations we have reviewed 
are not in any way specific to Keynesian models. The 
problem of identifying a structural model from a 
collection of economic time series is one that must be 
solved by anyone who claims the ability to give quan-
titative economic advice. The simplest Keynesian 
models are attempted solutions to this problem, as 
are the large-scale versions currently in use. So, too, 
are the monetarist models which imply the desir-
ability of fixed monetary growth rules. So, for that 
matter, is the armchair advice given by economists 
who claim to be outside the econometric tradition, 
though in this case the implicit, underlying structure 
is not exposed to professional criticism. Any proce-
dure which leads from the study of observed eco-
nomic behavior to the quantitative assessment of 
alternative economic policies involves the steps, exe-
cuted poorly or well, explicitly or implicitly, which we 
have outlined. 
Keynesian Macroeconometrics 
In Keynesian macroeconometric models structural 
parameters are identified by the imposition of several 
types of a priori restrictions on the Aj's, B/s, and R/s. 
These restrictions usually fall into one of the follow-
ing three categories:
3 
(a) A priori setting of many of the elements of the 
sThese three categories certainly do not exhaust the set of possible 
identifying restrictions, but they're the ones most identifying restric-
tions in Keynesian macroeconometric models fall into. Other possible 
sorts of identifying restrictions include, for example, a priori knowl-
edge about components of E and cross-equation restrictions across 
elements of the Aj's, B-s, and Cj's, neither of which is extensively used in 
Keynesian macroeconometrics. 
3 Aj's and Bj's to zero. 
(b) Restrictions on the orders of serial correlation 
and the extent of cross-serial correlation of the 
disturbance vector et, restrictions which amount 
to a priori setting of many elements of the Rj's to 
zero. 
(c) A priori classifying of variables as exogenous and 
endogenous. A relative abundance of exogenous 
variables aids identification. 
Existing large Keynesian macroeconometric models 
are open to serious challenge for the way they have 
introduced each type of restriction. 
Keynes' General Theory was rich in suggestions 
for restrictions of type (a). In it he proposed a theory 
of national income determination built up from 
several simple relationships, each involving a few 
variables only. One of these, for example, was the 
"fundamental law" relating consumption expenditures 
to income. This suggested one "row" in equations (1) 
involving current consumption, current income, and 
no other variables, thereby imposing many zero-
restrictions on the Aj's and B-s. Similarly, the liquidity 
preference relation expressed the demand for money 
as a function of only income and an interest rate. By 
translating the building blocks of the Keynesian 
theoretical system into explicit equations, models of 
the form (1) and (2) were constructed with many 
theoretical restrictions of type (a). 
Restrictions on the coefficients Rj governing the 
behavior of the error terms in (1) are harder to moti-
vate theoretically because the errors are by definition 
movements in the variables which the economic the-
ory cannot account for. The early econometricians 
took standard assumptions from statistical textbooks, 
restrictions which had proven useful in the agricul-
tural experimenting which provided the main impetus 
to the development of modern statistics. Again, these 
restrictions, well-motivated or not, involve setting 
many elements in the R-s equal to zero, thus aiding 
identification of the model's structure. 
The classification of variables into exogenous 
and endogenous was also done on the basis of prior 
considerations. In general, variables were classed as 
endogenous which were, as a matter of institutional 
fact, determined largely by the actions of private 
agents (like consumption or private investment ex-
penditures). Exogenous variables were those under 
governmental control (like tax rates or the supply 
of money). This division was intended to reflect the 
ordinary meanings of the words endogenous— 
"determined by the [economic] system" —and 
exogenous— "affecting the [economic] system but 
not affected by it." 
By the mid-1950s, econometric models had been 
constructed which fit time series data well, in the 
sense that their reduced forms (3) tracked past data 
closely and proved useful in short-term forecasting. 
Moreover, by means of restrictions of the three types 
reviewed above, their structural parameters A-v Bj, Rk 
could be identified. Using this estimated structure, 
the models could be simulated to obtain estimates of 
the consequences of different government economic 
policies, such as tax rates, expenditures, or monetary 
policy. 
This Keynesian solution to the problem of identi-
fying a structural model has become increasingly 
suspect as a result of both theoretical and statistical 
developments. Many of these developments are due 
to efforts of researchers sympathetic to the Keynes-
ian tradition, and many were advanced well before 
the spectacular failure of the Keynesian models in the 
1970s.
6 
Since its inception, macroeconomics has been 
criticized for its lack of foundations in microeco-
nomic and general equilibrium theory. As was recog-
nized early on by astute commentators like Leontief 
(1965, disapprovingly) and Tobin (1965, approvingly), 
the creation of a distinct branch of theory with its 
own distinct postulates was Keynes' conscious aim. 
Yet a main theme of theoretical work since the Gen-
eral Theory has been the attempt to use microeco-
nomic theory based on the classical postulate that 
agents act in their own interests to suggest a list of 
variables that belong on the right side of a given 
behavioral schedule, say, a demand schedule for a 
factor of production or a consumption schedule.
7 But 
6Criticisms of the Keynesian solutions of the identification prob-
lem along much the following lines have been made in Lucas 1976, Sims 
forthcoming, and Sargent and Sims 1977. 
7Much of this work was done by economists operating well within 
the Keynesian tradition, often within the context of some Keynesian 
macroeconometric model. Sometimes a theory with optimizing agents 
was resorted to in order to resolve empirical paradoxes by finding 
variables omitted from some of the earlier Keynesian econometric 
formulations. The works of Modigliani and Friedman on consumption 
are good examples of this line of work; its econometric implications 
Continued on next page 
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structural equation by means of restrictions of type 
(a), one needs reliable prior information that certain 
variables should be excluded from the right-hand 
side. Modern probabilistic microeconomic theory 
almost never implies either the exclusion restrictions 
suggested by Keynes or those imposed by macro-
econometric models. 
Let us consider one example with extremely dire 
implications for the identification of existing macro 
models. Expectations about the future prices, tax 
rates, and income levels play a critical role in many 
demand and supply schedules. In the best models, for 
example, investment demand typically is supposed to 
respond to businesses' expectations of future tax 
credits, tax rates, and factor costs, and the supply of 
labor typically is supposed to depend on the rate of 
inflation that workers expect in the future. Such struc-
tural equations are usually identified by the assump-
tion that the expectation about, say, factor prices or 
the rate of inflation attribute to agents is a function 
only of a few lagged values of the variable which the 
agent is supposed to be forecasting. However, the 
macro models themselves contain complicated dy-
namic interactions among endogenous variables, 
including factor prices and the rate of inflation, and 
they generally imply that a wise agent would use 
current and many lagged values of many and usually 
most endogenous and exogenous variables in the 
model in order to form expectations about any one 
variable. Thus, virtually any version of the hypothesis 
that agents act in their own interests will contradict 
the identification restrictions imposed on expecta-
tions formation. Further, the restrictions on expecta-
tions that have been used to achieve identification 
are entirely arbitrary and have not been derived from 
any deeper assumption reflecting first principles 
about economic behavior. No general first principle 
has ever been set down which would imply that, say, 
the expected rate of inflation should be modeled as a 
linear function of lagged rates of inflation alone with 
weights that add up to unity, yet this hypothesis is 
used as an identifying restriction in almost all existing 
models. The casual treatment of expectations is not a 
peripheral problem in these models, for the role of 
expectations is pervasive in them and exerts a 
massive influence on their dynamic properties (a point 
Keynes himself insisted on). The failure of existing 
models to derive restrictions on expectations from 
any first principles grounded in economic theory is a 
symptom of a deeper and more general failure to 
derive behavioral relationships from any consistently 
posed dynamic optimization problems. 
As for the second category, restrictions of type 
(b), existing Keynesian macro models make severe a 
priori restrictions on the R/s. Typically, the R/s are 
supposed to be diagonal so that cross-equation lagged 
serial correlation is ignored, and also the order of the 
et process is assumed to be short so that only low-
order serial correlation is allowed. There are at pres-
ent no theoretical grounds for introducing these re-
strictions, and for good reasons there is little prospect 
that economic theory will soon provide any such 
grounds. In principle, identification can be achieved 
without imposing any such restrictions. Foregoing 
the use of category (b) restrictions would increase the 
category (a) and (c) restrictions needed. In any event, 
existing macro models do heavily restrict the R/s. 
Turning to the third category, all existing large 
models adopt an a priori classification of variables as 
either strictly endogenous variables, the yt's, or strictly 
exogenous variables, the xt's. Increasingly it is being 
recognized that the classification of a variable as 
exogenous on the basis of the observation that it 
could be set without reference to the current and past 
values of other variables has nothing to do with the 
econometrically relevant question of how this vari-
able has in fact been related to others over a given 
historical period. Moreover, in light of recent de-
velopments in time series econometrics, we know 
that this arbitrary classification procedure is not nec-
essary. Christopher Sims (1972) has shown that in a 
time series context the hypothesis of econometric 
have been extended in important work by Robert Merton. The works of 
Tobin and Baumol on portfolio balance and of Jorgenson on invest-
ment are also in the tradition of applying optimizing microeconomic 
theories for generating macroeconomic behavior relations. In the last 
30 years, Keynesian econometric models have to a large extent devel-
oped along the line of trying to model agents' behavior as stemming 
from more and more sophisticated optimum problems. 
Our point here is certainly not to assert that Keynesian econo-
mists have completely foregone any use of optimizing microeconomic 
theory as a guide. Rather, it is that, especially when explicitly stochastic 
and dynamic problems have been studied, it has become increasingly 
apparent that microeconomic theory has very damaging implications 
for the restrictions conventionally used to identify Keynesian macro-
econometric models. Furthermore, as emphasized long ago by Tobin 
(1965), there is a point beyond which Keynesian models must suspend the 
hypothesis either of cleared markets or of optimizing agents if they are 
to possess the operating characteristics and policy implications that are 
the hallmarks of Keynesian economics. 
5 exogeneity can be tested. That is, Sims showed that 
the hypothesis that xt is strictly econometrically exog-
enous in (1) necessarily implies certain restrictions 
that can be tested given time series on the y's and x's. 
Tests along the lines of Sims' ought to be used rou-
tinely to check classifications into exogenous and 
endogenous sets of variables. To date they have not 
been. Prominent builders of large econometric mod-
els have even denied the usefulness of such tests. 
(See, for example, Ando 1977, pp. 209-10, and L. R. 
Klein in Okun and Perry 1973, p. 644.) 
Failure of Keynesian Macroeconometrics 
There are, therefore, a number of theoretical reasons 
for believing that the parameters identified as struc-
tural by current macroeconomic methods are not in 
fact structural. That is, we see no reason to believe 
that these models have isolated structures which will 
remain invariant across the class of interventions that 
figure in contemporary discussions of economic pol-
icy. Yet the question of whether a particular model is 
structural is an empirical, not a theoretical, one. If 
the macroeconometric models had compiled a rec-
ord of parameter stability, particularly in the face of 
breaks in the stochastic behavior of the exogenous 
variables and disturbances, one would be skeptical as 
to the importance of prior theoretical objections of 
the sort we have raised. 
In fact, however, the track record of the major 
econometric models is, on any dimension other than 
very short-term unconditional forecasting, very poor. 
Formal statistical tests for parameter instability, 
conducted by subdividing past series into periods 
and checking for parameter stability across time, 
invariably reveal major shifts. (For one example, see 
Muench et. al. 1974.) Moreover, this difficulty is im-
plicitly acknowledged by model builders themselves, 
who routinely employ an elaborate system of add-
factors in forecasting, in an attempt to offset the 
continuing drift of the model away from the actual 
series. 
Though not, of course, designed as such by any-
one, macroeconometric models were subjected to 
a decisive test in the 1970s. A key element in all 
Keynesian models is a trade-off between inflation and 
real output: the higher is the inflation rate, the higher 
is output (or equivalently, the lower is the rate of 
unemployment). For example, the models of the late 
1960s predicted a sustained U.S. unemployment rate 
of 4 percent as consistent with a 4 percent annual rate 
of inflation. Based on this prediction, many econo-
mists at that time urged a deliberate policy of infla-
tion. Certainly the erratic "fits and starts" character 
of actual U.S. policy in the 1970s cannot be attributed 
to recommendations based on Keynesian models, but 
the inflationary bias on average of monetary and fiscal 
policy in this period should, according to all of these 
models, have produced the lowest average unem-
ployment rates for any decade since the 1940s. In 
fact, as we know, they produced the highest unem-
ployment rates since the 1930s. This was econometric 
failure on a grand scale. 
This failure has not led to widespread conver-
sions of Keynesian economists to other faiths, nor 
should it have been expected to. In economics as in 
other sciences, a theoretical framework is always 
broader and more flexible than any particular set of 
equations, and there is always the hope that if a 
particular specific model fails one can find a more 
successful model based on roughly the same ideas. 
The failure has, however, already had some impor-
tant consequences, with serious implications for both 
economic policymaking and the practice of eco-
nomic science. 
For policy, the central fact is that Keynesian 
policy recommendations have no sounder basis, in a 
scientific sense, than recommendations of non-Keynes-
ian economists or, for that matter, noneconomists. 
To note one consequence of the wide recognition of 
this, the current wave of protectionist sentiment 
directed at "saving jobs" would have been answered 
ten years ago with the Keynesian counterargument 
that fiscal policy can achieve the same end, but more 
efficiently. Today, of course, no one would take this 
response seriously, so it is not offered. Indeed, econo-
mists who ten years ago championed Keynesian fiscal 
policy as an alternative to inefficient direct controls 
increasingly favor such controls as supplements to 
Keynesian policy. The idea seems to be that if people 
refuse to obey the equations we have fit to their past 
behavior, we can pass laws to make them do so. 
Scientifically, the Keynesian failure of the 1970s 
has resulted in a new openness. Fewer and fewer 
economists are involved in monitoring and refining 
the major econometric models; more and more are 
developing alternative theories of the business cycle, 
based on different theoretical principles. In addition, 
6  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1979 more attention and respect is accorded to the theo-
retical casualties of the Keynesian Revolution, to the 
ideas of Keynes
1 contemporaries and of earlier econ-
omists whose thinking has been regarded for years as 
outmoded. 
No one can foresee where these developments 
will lead. Some, of course, continue to believe that 
the problems of existing Keynesian models can be 
resolved within the existing framework, that these 
models can be adequately refined by changing a few 
structural equations, by adding or subtracting a few 
variables here and there, or perhaps by disaggregat-
ing various blocks of equations. We have couched 
our criticisms in such general terms precisely to em-
phasize their generic character and hence the futility 
of pursuing minor variations within this general frame-
work. A second response to the failure of Keynesian 
analytical methods is to renounce analytical methods 
entirely, returning to judgmental methods. 
The first of these responses identifies the quanti-
tative, scientific goals of the Keynesian Revolution 
with the details of the particular models developed so 
far. The second renounces both these models and the 
objectives they were designed to attain. There is, we 
believe, an intermediate course, to which we now 
turn. 
Equilibrium Business Cycle Theory 
Before the 1930s, economists did not recognize a 
need for a special branch of economics, with its own 
special postulates, designed to explain the business 
cycle. Keynes founded that subdiscipline, called 
macroeconomics, because he thought explaining the 
characteristics of business cycles was impossible 
within the discipline imposed by classical economic 
theory, a discipline imposed by its insistence on ad-
herence to the two postulates (a) that markets clear 
and (b) that agents act in their own self-interest. The 
outstanding facts that seemed impossible to reconcile 
with these two postulates were the length and severity 
of business depressions and the large-scale unem-
ployment they entailed. A related observation was 
that measures of aggregate demand and prices were 
positively correlated with measures of real output 
and employment, in apparent contradiction to the 
classical result that changes in a purely nominal mag-
nitude like the general price level were pure unit 
changes which should not alter real behavior. 
After freeing himself of the straightjacket (or dis-
cipline) imposed by the classical postulates, Keynes 
described a model in which rules of thumb, such as 
the consumption function and liquidity preference 
schedule, took the place of decision functions that a 
classical economist would insist be derived from the 
theory of choice. And rather than require that wages 
and prices be determined by the postulate that mar-
kets clear—which for the labor market seemed pat-
ently contradicted by the severity of business de-
pressions—Keynes took as an unexamined postulate 
that money wages are sticky, meaning that they are 
set at a level or by a process that could be taken as 
uninfluenced by the macroeconomic forces he pro-
posed to analyze. 
When Keynes wrote, the terms equilibrium and 
classical carried certain positive and normative con-
notations which seemed to rule out either modifier 
being applied to business cycle theory. The term 
equilibrium was thought to refer to a system at rest, 
and some used both equilibrium and classical inter-
changeably with ideal. Thus an economy in classical 
equilibrium would be both unchanging and unim-
provable by policy interventions. With terms used in 
this way, it is no wonder that few economists re-
garded equilibrium theory as a promising starting 
point to understand business cycles and design poli-
cies to mitigate or eliminate them. 
In recent years, the meaning of the term equilib-
rium has changed so dramatically that a theorist of 
the 1930s would not recognize it. An economy follow-
ing a multivariate stochastic process is now routinely 
described as being in equilibrium, by which is meant 
nothing more than that at each point in time, postu-
lates (a) and (b) above are satisfied. This develop-
ment, which stemmed mainly from work by K. J. 
Arrow (1964) and G. Debreu (1959), implies that sim-
ply to look at any economic time series and conclude 
that it is a disequilibrium phenomenon is a meaning-
less observation. Indeed, a more likely conjecture, on 
the basis of recent work by Hugo Sonnenschein 
(1973), is that the general hypothesis that a collection 
of time series describes an economy in competitive 
equilibrium is without content.
8 
The research line being pursued by some of us 
Tor an example that illustrates the emptiness at a general level of 
the statement that employers are always operating along dynamic 
stochastic demands for factors, see the remarks on econometric identi-
Continued on next page 
7 involves the attempt to discover a particular, econo-
metrically testable equilibrium theory of the business 
cycle, one that can serve as the foundation for quanti-
tative analysis of macroeconomic policy. There is no 
denying that this approach is counterrevolutionary, 
for it presupposes that Keynes and his followers were 
wrong to give up on the possibility that an equilibrium 
theory could account for the business cycle. As of 
now, no successful equilibrium macroeconometric 
model at the level of detail of, say, the Federal Re-
serve-MIT-Penn model has been constructed. But 
small theoretical equilibrium models have been con-
structed that show potential for explaining some key 
features of the business cycle long thought inexplic-
able within the confines of classical postulates. The 
equilibrium models also provide reasons for under-
standing why estimated Keynesian models fail to hold 
up outside the sample over which they have been 
estimated. We now turn to describing some of the 
key facts about business cycles and the way the new 
classical models confront them. 
For a long time most of the economics profession 
has, with some reason, followed Keynes in rejecting 
classical macroeconomic models because they seemed 
incapable of explaining some important characteris-
tics of time series measuring important economic 
aggregates. Perhaps the most important failure of the 
classical model was its apparent inability to explain 
the positive correlation in the time series between 
prices and/or wages, on the one hand, and measures 
of aggregate output or employment, on the other. A 
second and related failure was its inability to explain 
the positive correlations between measures of aggre-
gate demand, like the money stock, and aggregate 
output or employment. Static analysis of classical 
macroeconomic models typically implied that the 
levels of output and employment were determined 
independently of both the absolute level of prices and 
of aggregate demand. But the pervasive presence of 
positive correlations in the time series seems consis-
tent with causal connections flowing from aggregate 
demand and inflation to output and employment, 
contrary to the classical neutrality propositions. 
Keynesian macroeconometric models do imply such 
causal connections. 
We now have rigorous theoretical models which 
illustrate how these correlations can emerge while 
retaining the classical postulates that markets clear 
and agents optimize (Phelps 1970 and Lucas 1972, 
1975). The key step in obtaining such models has 
been to relax the ancillary postulate used in much 
classical economic analysis that agents have perfect 
information. The new classical models still assume 
that markets clear and that agents optimize; agents 
make their supply and demand decisions based on 
real variables, including perceived relative prices. 
However, each agent is assumed to have limited infor-
mation and to receive information about some prices 
more often than other prices. On the basis of their 
limited information—the lists that they have of current 
and past absolute prices of various goods—agents 
are assumed to make the best possible estimate of all 
of the relative prices that influence their supply and 
demand decisions. 
Because they do not have all of the information 
necessary to compute perfectly the relative prices 
they care about, agents make errors in estimating the 
pertinent relative prices, errors that are unavoidable 
given their limited information. In particular, under 
certain conditions, agents tend temporarily to mis-
take a general increase in all absolute prices as an 
increase in the relative price of the good they are 
selling, leading them to increase their supply of that 
good over what they had previously planned. Since 
on average everyone is making the same mistake, 
aggregate output rises above what it would have been. 
This increase of output above what it would have 
been occurs whenever this period's average economy-
wide price level is above what agents had expected 
it to be on the basis of previous information. Sym-
metrically, aggregate output decreases whenever the 
aggregate price turns out to be lower than agents had 
expected. The hypothesis of rational expectations is 
being imposed here: agents are assumed to make the 
best possible use of the limited information they have 
and to know the pertinent objective probability distri-
fication in Sargent 1978. In applied problems that involve modeling 
agents' optimum decision rules, one is impressed at how generalizing 
the specification of agents' objective functions in plausible ways 
quickly leads to econometric underidentification. 
A somewhat different class of examples comes from the diffi-
culties in using time series observations to refute the view that agents 
only respond to unexpected changes in the money supply. In the 
equilibrium macroeconometric models we will describe, predictable 
changes in the money supply do not affect real GNP or total employ-
ment. In Keynesian models, they do. At a general level, it is impossible 
to discriminate between these two views by observing time series drawn 
from an economy described by a stationary vector random process 
(Sargent 1976b). 
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to the tenets of equilibrium theory. 
In the new classical theory, disturbances to ag-
gregate demand lead to a positive correlation be-
tween unexpected changes in the aggregate price 
level and revisions in aggregate output from its pre-
viously planned level. Further, it is easy to show that 
the theory implies correlations between revisions in 
aggregate output and unexpected changes in any vari-
ables that help determine aggregate demand. In most 
macroeconomic models, the money supply is one 
determinant of aggregate demand. The new theory 
can easily account for positive correlations between 
revisions to aggregate output and unexpected in-
creases in the money supply. 
While such a theory predicts positive correla-
tions between the inflation rate or money supply, on 
the one hand, and the level of output, on the other, it 
also asserts that those correlations do not depict trade-
offs that can be exploited by a policy authority. That 
is, the theory predicts that there is no way that the 
monetary authority can follow a systematic activist 
policy and achieve a rate of output that is on average 
higher over the business cycle than what would occur 
if it simply adopted a no-feedback, X-percent rule of 
the kind Friedman (1948) and Simons (1936) recom-
mended. For the theory predicts that aggregate output 
is a function of current and past unexpected changes 
in the money supply. Output will be high only when 
the money supply is and has been higher than it had 
been expected to be, that is, higher than average. 
There is simply no way that on average over the 
whole business cycle the money supply can be higher 
than average. Thus, while the theory can explain 
some of the correlations long thought to invalidate 
classical macroeconomic theory, it is classical both in 
its adherence to the classical theoretical postulates 
and in the nonactivist flavor of its implications for 
monetary policy. 
Small-scale econometric models in the standard 
sense have been constructed which capture some of 
the main features of the new classical theory. (See, 
for example, Sargent 1976a.)
9 In particular, these 
models incorporate the hypothesis that expectations 
are rational or that agents use all available informa-
tion. To some degree, these models achieve econo-
metric identification by invoking restrictions in each 
of the three categories (a), (b), and (c). However, a 
distinguishing feature of these "classical" models is 
that they also rely heavily on an important fourth 
category of identifying restrictions. This category (d) 
consists of a set of restrictions that are derived from 
probabilistic economic theory but play no role in the 
Keynesian framework. These restrictions in general 
do not take the form of zero restrictions of the type 
(a). Instead they typically take the form of cross-
equation restrictions among the Aj, Bj, Cjparameters. 
The source of these restrictions is the implication 
from economic theory that current decisions depend 
on agents' forecasts of future variables, combined 
with the implication that these forecasts are formed 
optimally, given the behavior of past variables. The 
restrictions do not have as simple a mathematical 
expression as simply setting a number of parameters 
equal to zero, but their economic motivation is easy 
to understand. Ways of utilizing these restrictions in 
econometric estimation and testing are rapidly being 
developed. 
Another key characteristic of recent work on 
equilibrium macroeconometric models is that the 
reliance on entirely a priori categorizations (c) of 
variables as strictly exogenous and endogenous has 
been markedly reduced, although not entirely elimi-
nated. This development stems jointly from the fact 
that the models assign important roles to agents' opti-
mal forecasts of future variables and from Christopher 
Sims' (1972) demonstration that there is a close con-
nection between the concept of strict econometric 
exogeneity and the forms of the optimal predictors 
for a vector of time series. Building a model with 
rational expectations necessarily forces one to con-
sider which set of other variables helps forecast a given 
variable, say, income or the inflation rate. If variable y 
helps predict variable x, the Sims' theorems imply that 
x cannot be regarded as exogenous with respect to y. 
9Dissatisfaction with the Keynesian methods of achieving identifi-
cation has also led to other lines of macroeconometric work. One line is 
the index models described by Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke 
(1977). These models amount to a statistically precise way of imple-
menting Wesley Mitchell's notion that a small number of common 
influences explain the covariation of a large number of economic 
aggregates over the business cycle. This low dimensionality hypothesis 
is a potential device for restricting the number of parameters to be 
estimated in vector time series models. This line of work is not entirely 
atheoretical (but see the comments of Ando and Klein in Sims 1977), 
though it is distinctly un-Keynesian. As it happens, certain equilibrium 
models of the business cycle do seem to lead to low dimensional index 
models with an interesting pattern of variables' loadings on indexes. In 
general, modern Keynesian models do not so easily assume a low-index 
form. See the discussion in Sargent and Sims 1977. 
9 The result of this connection between predictability 
and exogeneity has been that in equilibrium macro-
econometric models the distinction between endog-
enous and exogenous variables has not been drawn 
on an entirely a priori basis. Furthermore, special 
cases of the theoretical models, which often involve 
side restrictions on the R-s not themselves drawn from 
economic theory, have strong testable predictions as 
to exogeneity relations among variables. 
A key characteristic of equilibrium macroecono-
metric models is that as a result of the restrictions 
across the A/s, B/s, and C/s, the models predict that 
in general the parameters in many of the equations 
will change if there is a policy intervention that takes 
the form of a change in one equation that describes 
how some policy variable is being set. Since they 
ignore these cross-equation restrictions, Keynesian 
models in general assume that all other equations 
remain unchanged when an equation describing a 
policy variable is changed. We think this is one 
important reason Keynesian models have broken 
down when the equations governing policy variables 
or exogenous variables have changed significantly. 
We hope that the new methods we have described 
will give us the capability to predict the consequences 
for all of the equations of changes in the rules govern-
ing policy variables. Having that capability is neces-
sary before we can claim to have a scientific basis 
for making quantitative statements about macroeco-
nomic policy. 
So far, these new theoretical and econometric 
developments have not been fully integrated, al-
though clearly they are very close, both conceptually 
and operationally. We consider the best currently 
existing equilibrium models as prototypes of better, 
future models which will, we hope, prove of practical 
use in the formulation of policy. 
But we should not understate the econometric 
success already attained by equilibrium models. 
Early versions of these models have been estimated 
and subjected to some stringent econometric tests by 
McCallum (1976), Barro (1977, forthcoming), and 
Sargent (1976a), with the result that they do seem 
able to explain some broad features of the business 
cycle. New and more sophisticated models involving 
more complicated cross-equation restrictions are in 
the works (Sargent 1978). Work to date has already 
shown that equilibrium models can attain within-
sample fits about as good as those obtained by 
Keynesian models, thereby making concrete the 
point that the good fits of the Keynesian models 
provide no good reason for trusting policy recom-
mendations derived from them. 
Criticism of Equilibrium Theory 
The central idea of the equilibrium explanations of 
business cycles sketched above is that economic 
fluctuations arise as agents react to unanticipated 
changes in variables which impinge on their deci-
sions. Clearly, any explanation of this general type 
must imply severe limitations on the ability of govern-
ment policy to offset these initiating changes. First, 
governments must somehow be able to foresee 
shocks invisible to private agents but at the same time 
be unable to reveal this advance information (hence, 
defusing the shocks). Though it is not hard to design 
theoretical models in which these two conditions are 
assumed to hold, it is difficult to imagine actual situa-
tions in which such models would apply. Second, the 
governmental countercyclical policy must itself be 
unforeseeable by private agents (certainly a fre-
quently realized condition historically) while at the 
same time be systematically related to the state of the 
economy. Effectiveness, then, rests on the inability of 
private agents to recognize systematic patterns in 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
To a large extent, criticism of equilibrium models 
is simply a reaction to these implications for policy. 
So wide is (or was) the consensus that the task of 
macroeconomics is the discovery of the particular 
monetary and fiscal policies which can eliminate fluc-
tuations by reacting to private sector instability that 
the assertion that this task either should not or cannot 
be performed is regarded as frivolous, regardless of 
whatever reasoning and evidence may support it. 
Certainly one must have some sympathy with this 
reaction: an unfounded faith in the curability of a 
particular ill has served often enough as a stimulus to 
the finding of genuine cures. Yet to confuse a possi-
bly functional faith in the existence of efficacious, 
reactive monetary and fiscal policies with scientific 
evidence that such policies are known is clearly dan-
gerous, and to use such faith as a criterion forjudging 
the extent to which particular theories fit the facts is 
worse still. 
There are, of course, legitimate questions about 
how well equilibrium theories can fit the facts of the 
business cycle. Indeed, this is the reason for our in-
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the particular models we now have. Yet these tenta-
tive models share certain features which can be re-
garded as essential, so it is not unreasonable to specu-
late as to the likelihood that any model of this type 
can be successful or to ask what equilibrium business 
cycle theorists will have in ten years if we get lucky. 
Four general reasons for pessimism have been 
prominently advanced: 
(a) Equilibrium models unrealistically postulate 
cleared markets. 
(b) These models cannot account for "persistence" 
(serial correlation) of cyclical movements. 
(c) Econometrically implemented models are linear 
(in logarithms). 
(d) Learning behavior has not been incorporated in 
these models. 
Cleared Markets 
One essential feature of equilibrium models is that all 
markets clear, or that all observed prices and quanti-
ties are viewed as outcomes of decisions taken by 
individual firms and households. In practice, this 
has meant a conventional, competitive supply-equals-
demand assumption, though other kinds of equilibria 
can easily be imagined (if not so easily analyzed). If, 
therefore, one takes as a basic "fact" that labor mar-
kets do not clear, one arrives immediately at a contra-
diction between theory and fact. The facts we ac-
tually have, however, are simply the available time 
series on employment and wage rates plus the re-
sponses to our unemployment surveys. Cleared mar-
kets is simply a principle, not verifiable by direct 
observation, which may or may not be useful in con-
structing successful hypotheses about the behavior of 
these series. Alternative principles, such as the pos-
tulate of the existence of a third-party auctioneer 
inducing wage rigidity and uncleared markets, are 
similarly "unrealistic," in the not especially important 
sense of not offering a good description of observed 
labor market institutions. 
A refinement of the unexplained postulate of an 
uncleared labor market has been suggested by the 
indisputable fact that long-term labor contracts with 
horizons of two or three years exist. Yet the length 
per se over which contracts run does not bear on the 
issue, for we know from Arrow and Debreu that if 
infinitely long-term contracts are determined so that 
prices and wages are contingent on the same informa-
tion that is available under the assumption of period-
by-period market clearing, then precisely the same 
price-quantity process will result with the long-term 
contract as would occur under period-by-period mar-
ket clearing. Thus equilibrium theorizing provides a 
way, probably the only way we have, to construct a 
model of a long-term contract. The fact that long-
term contracts exist, then, has no implications about 
the applicability of equilibrium theorizing. 
Rather, the real issue here is whether actual con-
tracts can be adequately accounted for within an 
equilibrium model, that is, a model in which agents 
are proceeding in their own best interests. Stanley 
Fischer (1977), Edmund Phelps and John Taylor 
(1977), and Robert Hall (1978) have shown that some 
of the nonactivist conclusions of the equilibrium 
models are modified if one substitutes for period-by-
period market clearing the imposition of long-term 
contracts drawn contingent on restricted information 
sets that are exogenously imposed and that are as-
sumed to be independent of monetary and fiscal re-
gimes. Economic theory leads us to predict that the 
costs of collecting and processing information will 
make it optimal for contracts to be made contingent 
on a small subset of the information that could possi-
bly be collected at any date. But theory also suggests 
that the particular set of information upon which 
contracts will be made contingent is not immutable 
but depends on the structure of costs and benefits of 
collecting various kinds of information. This struc-
ture of costs and benefits will change with every 
change in the exogenous stochastic processes facing 
agents. This theoretical presumption is supported by 
an examination of the way labor contracts differ 
across high-inflation and low-inflation countries and 
the way they have evolved in the U.S. over the last 25 
years. 
So the issue here is really the same fundamental 
one involved in the dispute between Keynes and the 
classical economists: Should we regard certain super-
ficial characteristics of existing wage contracts as 
given when analyzing the consequences of alterna-
tive monetary and fiscal regimes? Classical economic 
theory says no. To understand the implications of 
long-term contracts for monetary policy, we need a 
model of the way those contracts are likely to re-
spond to alternative monetary policy regimes. An 
extension of existing equilibrium models in this direc-
tion might well lead to interesting variations, but it 
11 seems to us unlikely that major modifications of the 
implications of these models for monetary and fiscal 
policy will follow from this. 
Persistence 
A second line of criticism stems from the correct ob-
servation that if agents' expectations are rational and 
if their information sets include lagged values of the 
variable being forecast, then agents' forecast errors 
must be a serially uncorrelated random process. That 
is, on average there must be no detectable relation-
ships between a period's forecast error and any pre-
vious period's. This feature has led several critics to 
conclude that equilibrium models cannot account for 
more than an insignificant part of the highly serially 
correlated movements we observe in real output, 
employment, unemployment, and other series. Tobin 
(1977, p. 461) has put the argument succinctly: 
One currently popular explanation of variations in 
employment is temporary confusion of relative and 
absolute prices. Employers and workers are fooled 
into too many jobs by unexpected inflation, but only 
until they learn it affects other prices, not just the 
prices of what they sell. The reverse happens tempo-
rarily when inflation falls short of expectation. This 
model can scarcely explain more than transient dis-
equilibrium in labor markets. 
So how can the faithful explain the slow cycles of 
unemployment we actually observe? Only by arguing 
that the natural rate itself fluctuates, that variations in 
unemployment rates are substantially changes in vol-
untary, frictional, or structural unemployment rather 
than in involuntary joblessness due to generally defi-
cient demand. 
The critics typically conclude that the theory only 
attributes a very minor role to aggregate demand 
fluctuations and necessarily depends on disturbances 
to aggregate supply to account for most of the fluctua-
tions in real output over the business cycle. "In other 
words," as Modigliani (1977) has said, "what hap-
pened to the United States in the 1930's was a severe 
attack of contagious laziness." 
This criticism is fallacious because it fails to dis-
tinguish properly between sources of impulses and 
propagation mechanisms, a distinction stressed by 
Ragnar Frisch in a classic 1933 paper that provided 
many of the technical foundations for Keynesian 
macroeconometric models. Even though the new 
classical theory implies that the forecast errors which 
are the aggregate demand impulses are serially un-
correlated, it is certainly logically possible that propa-
gation mechanisms are at work that convert these 
impulses into serially correlated movements in real 
variables like output and employment. Indeed, de-
tailed theoretical work has already shown that two 
concrete propagation mechanisms do precisely that. 
One mechanism stems from the presence of costs 
to firms of adjusting their stocks of capital and labor 
rapidly. The presence of these costs is known to make 
it optimal for firms to spread out over time their 
response to the relative price signals they receive. 
That is, such a mechanism causes a firm to convert 
the serially uncorrelated forecast errors in predicting 
relative prices into serially correlated movements in 
factor demands and output. 
A second propagation mechanism is already 
present in the most classical of economic growth 
models. Households' optimal accumulation plans for 
claims on physical capital and other assets convert 
serially uncorrelated impulses into serially correlated 
demands for the accumulation of real assets. This 
happens because agents typically want to divide any 
unexpected changes in income partly between con-
suming and accumulating assets. Thus, the demand 
for assets next period depends on initial stocks and on 
unexpected changes in the prices or income facing 
agents. This dependence makes serially uncorrelated 
surprises lead to serially correlated movements in 
demands for physical assets. Lucas (1975) showed 
how this propagation mechanism readily accepts er-
rors in forecasting aggregate demand as an impulse 
source. 
A third likely propagation mechanism has been 
identified by recent work in search theory. (See, for 
example, McCall 1965, Mortensen 1970, and Lucas 
and Prescott 1974.) Search theory tries to explain why 
workers who for some reason are without jobs find it 
rational not necessarily to take the first job offer that 
comes along but instead to remain unemployed for 
awhile until a better offer materializes. Similarly, the 
theory explains why a firm may find it optimal to wait 
until a more suitable job applicant appears so that 
vacancies persist for some time. Mainly for technical 
reasons, consistent theoretical models that permit 
this propagation mechanism to accept errors in fore-
casting aggregate demand as an impulse have not yet 
been worked out, but the mechanism seems likely 
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model of the time series behavior of the unemploy-
ment rate. 
In models where agents have imperfect informa-
tion, either of the first two mechanisms and probably 
the third can make serially correlated movements in 
real variables stem from the introduction of a serially 
uncorrelated sequence of forecasting errors. Thus 
theoretical and econometric models have been con-
structed in which in principle the serially uncorre-
lated process of forecasting errors can account for 
any proportion between zero and one of the steady-
state variance of real output or employment. The 
argument that such models must necessarily attribute 
most of the variance in real output and employment 
to variations in aggregate supply is simply wrong 
logically. 
Linearity 
Most of the econometric work implementing equilib-
rium models has involved fitting statistical models 
that are linear in the variables (but often highly non-
linear in the parameters). This feature is subject to 
criticism on the basis of the indisputable principle 
that there generally exist nonlinear models that pro-
vide better approximations than linear models. More 
specifically, models that are linear in the variables 
provide no way to detect and analyze systematic 
effects of higher than first-order moments of the 
shocks and the exogenous variables on the first-order 
moments of the endogenous variables. Such system-
atic effects are generally present where the endog-
enous variables are set by risk-averse agents. 
There are no theoretical reasons that most ap-
plied work has used linear models, only compelling 
technical reasons given today's computer technol-
ogy. The predominant technical requirement of 
econometric work which imposes rational expecta-
tions is the ability to write down analytical expres-
sions giving agents' decision rules as functions of the 
parameters of their objective functions and as func-
tions of the parameters governing the exogenous ran-
dom processes they face. Dynamic stochastic maxi-
mum problems with quadratic objectives, which pro-
duce linear decision rules, do meet this essential re-
quirement—that is their virtue. Only a few other 
functional forms for agents' objective functions in 
dynamic stochastic optimum problems have this 
same necessary analytical tractability. Computer 
technology in the foreseeable future seems to require 
working with such a class of functions, and the class 
of linear decision rules has just semed most conve-
nient for most purposes. No issue of principle is in-
volved in selecting one out of the very restricted class 
of functions available. Theoretically, we know how 
to calculate, with expensive recursive methods, the 
nonlinear decision rules that would stem from a very 
wide class of objective functions; no new econo-
metric principles would be involved in estimating 
their parameters, only a much higher computer bill. 
Further, as Frisch and Slutsky emphasized, linear 
stochastic difference equations are a very flexible 
device for studying business cycles. It is an open 
question whether for explaining the central features 
of the business cycle there will be a big reward to 
fitting nonlinear models. 
Stationary Models and the Neglect of Learning 
Benjamin Friedman and others have criticized ra-
tional expectations models apparently on the 
grounds that much theoretical and almost all empiri-
cal work has assumed that agents have been operating 
for a long time in a stochastically stationary environ-
ment. Therefore, agents are typically assumed to 
have discovered the probability laws of the variables 
they want to forecast. Modigliani (1977, p. 6) put the 
argument this way: 
At the logical level, Benjamin Friedman has called 
attention to the omission from [equilibrium macro-
economic models] of an explicit learning model, and 
has suggested that, as a result, it can only be inter-
preted as a description not of short-run but of long-run 
equilibrium in which no agent would wish to recon-
tract. But then the implications of [equilibrium macro-
economic models] are clearly far from startling, and 
their policy relevance is almost nil. 
But it has been only a matter of analytical conve-
nience and not of necessity that equilibrium models 
have used the assumption of stochastically stationary 
shocks and the assumption that agents have already 
learned the probability distributions they face. Both 
of these assumptions can be abandoned, albeit at a 
cost in terms of the simplicity of the model. (For 
example, see Crawford 1971 and Grossman 1975.) In 
fact, within the framework of quadratic objective 
functions, in which the "separation principle" ap-
plies, one can apply the Kalman filtering formula to 
13 derive optimum linear decision rules with time de-
pendent coefficients. In this framework, the Kalman 
filter permits a neat application of Bayesian learning 
to updating optimal forecasting rules from period to 
period as new information becomes available. The 
Kalman filter also permits the derivation of optimum 
decision rules for an interesting class of nonstation-
ary exogenous processes assumed to face agents. 
Equilibrium theorizing in this context thus readily 
leads to a model of how process nonstationarity and 
Bayesian learning applied by agents to the exogenous 
variables leads to time-dependent coefficients in 
agents' decision rules. 
While models incorporating Bayesian learning 
and stochastic nonstationarity are both technically 
feasible and consistent with the equilibrium modeling 
strategy, we know of almost no successful applied 
work along these lines. One probable reason for this 
is that nonstationary time series models are cumber-
some and come in so many varieties. Another is that 
the hypothesis of Bayesian learning is vacuous until 
one either arbitrarily imputes a prior distribution to 
agents or develops a method of estimating param-
eters of the prior from time series data. Determining a 
prior distribution from the data would involve esti-
mating initial conditions and would proliferate nui-
sance parameters in a very unpleasant way. Whether 
these techniques will pay off in terms of explaining 
macroeconomic time series is an empirical matter: 
it is not a matter distinguishing equilibrium from 
Keynesian macroeconometric models. In fact, no 
existing Keynesian macroeconometric model incor-
porates either an economic model of learning or an 
economic model in any way restricting the pattern of 
coefficient nonstationarities across equations. 
The macroeconometric models criticized by 
Friedman and Modigliani, which assume agents have 
caught on to the stationary random processes they 
face, give rise to systems of linear stochastic differ-
ence equations of the form (1), (2), and (4). As has 
been known for a long time, such stochastic differ-
ence equations generate series that "look like" eco-
nomic time series. Further, if viewed as structural 
(that is, invariant with respect to policy interven-
tions), the models have some of the implications for 
countercyclical policy that we have described above. 
Whether or not these policy implications are correct 
depends on whether or not the models are structural 
and not at all on whether the models can successfully 
be caricatured by terms such as "long-run" or "short-
run." 
It is worth reemphasizing that we do not wish our 
responses to these criticisms to be mistaken for a 
claim that existing equilibrium models can satisfac-
torily account for all the main features of the ob-
served business cycle. Rather, we have simply argued 
that no sound reasons have yet been advanced which 
even suggest that these models are, as a class, in-
capable of providing a satisfactory business cycle 
theory. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Let us attempt to set out in compact form the main 
arguments advanced in this paper. We will then com-
ment briefly on the main implications of these argu-
ments for the way we can usefully think about eco-
nomic policy. 
Our first and most important point is that existing 
Keynesian macroeconometric models cannot pro-
vide reliable guidance in the formulation of mone-
tary, fiscal, or other types of policy. This conclusion 
is based in part on the spectacular recent failures of 
these models and in part on their lack of a sound 
theoretical or econometric basis. Second, on the lat-
ter ground, there is no hope that minor or even major 
modification of these models will lead to significant 
improvement in their reliability. 
Third, equilibrium models can be formulated 
which are free of these difficulties and which offer a 
different set of principles to identify structural econo-
metric models. The key elements of these models are 
that agents are rational, reacting to policy changes in 
a way which is in their best interests privately, and 
that the impulses which trigger business fluctuations 
are mainly unanticipated shocks. 
Fourth, equilibrium models already developed 
account for the main qualitative features of the busi-
ness cycle. These models are being subjected to con-
tinued criticism, especially by those engaged in 
developing them, but arguments to the effect that 
equilibrium theories are in principle unable to ac-
count for a substantial part of observed fluctuations 
appear due mainly to simple misunderstandings. 
The policy implications of equilibrium theories 
are sometimes caricatured, by friendly as well as 
unfriendly commentators, as the assertion that "eco-
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This implication would certainly startle neoclassical 
economists who have successfully applied equilib-
rium theory to the study of innumerable problems 
involving important effects of fiscal policies on re-
source allocation and income distribution. Our intent 
is not to reject these accomplishments but rather to 
try to imitate them or to extend the equilibrium meth-
ods which have been applied to many economic prob-
lems to cover a phenomenon which has so far resisted 
their application: the business cycle. 
Should this intellectual arbitrage prove success-
ful, it will suggest important changes in the way we 
think about policy. Most fundamentally, it will focus 
attention on the need to think of policy as the choice 
of stable rules of the game, well understood by eco-
nomic agents. Only in such a setting will economic 
theory help predict the actions agents will choose to 
take. This approach will also suggest that policies 
which affect behavior mainly because their conse-
quences cannot be correctly diagnosed, such as 
monetary instability and deficit financing, have the 
capacity only to disrupt. The deliberate provision of 
misinformation cannot be used in a systematic way to 
improve the economic environment. 
The objectives of equilibrium business cycle the-
ory are taken, without modification, from the goal 
which motivated the construction of the Keynesian 
macroeconometric models: to provide a scientifi-
cally based means of assessing, quantitatively, the 
likely effects of alternative economic policies. With-
out the econometric successes achieved by the 
Keynesian models, this goal would be simply incon-
ceivable. However, unless the now evident limits of 
these models are also frankly acknowledged and radi-
cally different new directions taken, the real accom-
plishments of the Keynesian Revolution will be lost as 
surely as those we now know to be illusory. 
10A main source of this belief is probably Sargent and Wallace 1975, 
which showed that in the context of a fairly standard macroeconomic 
model, but with agents' expectations assumed rational, the choice of a 
reactive monetary rule is of no consequence for the behavior of real 
variables. The point of this example was to show that within precisely 
that model used to rationalize reactive monetary policies, such policies 
could be shown to be of no value. It hardly follows that all policy is 
ineffective in all contexts. 
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